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Abstract
In this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts,
where each coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of feasible contracts to
choose from. We call such problems, contract choice problems. We provide
conditions under which a contract choice problem has a non-empty set of "stable"
outcomes. There are two types of stability concepts we study in this paper:
cooperative stability and non-cooperative stability. The cooperative stability
concept that we invoke here is the core. The non-cooperative stability concept that
we study here is individual stability. The final result of this paper states that every
contract choice problem has a non-empty weak bargaining set.
1. Introduction: 
In this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts,
where each coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of feasible contracts to
choose from. We call such problems, contract choice problems. The economic
motivation behind the problem, arises from several real world "commons
problems", where agents can pool their initial resources and produce a marketable
surplus, which needs to be shared among themselves. There are clearly, two
distinct problems that arise out of such real world possibilities: (i) Coalition
Formation: Which are the disjoint coalitions that will form in order to pool in their
resources? (ii) Distribution: How will a coalition distribute the surplus within
itself? While, the possibility of an aggregate amount of surplus being generated
by a coalition is fairly common, there are many situations where more than one
aggregate surplus results from a cooperative activity, and the distribution of the
surplus depends on the particular aggregate that a coalition chooses to share. 
The model we propose is a generalization of the model due to Shapley and Scarf
(1974) called the housing market. Shapley and Scarf (1974), considers a private
ownership economy, where each individual owns exactly one object and what is
sought is the existence of an allocation in the core of the economy. In our model
each non-empty subset of agents has a non-empty finite set of pay-off vectors to
choose from. An outcome comprises a partition of the set of agents, and an
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is therefore a special kind of cooperative game with non-transferable utility. In the
context of our contract choice model, the Shapley-Scarf housing market
corresponds to a situation, where each individual assigns a monetary worth to
each object, and a feasible pay-off vector for a coalition, is the set of utility
vectors available to the coalition, when it re-allocates objects within itself,
without any one in the coalition retaining his initial endowment, unless the
coalition is a singleton. 
Our primary objective in this paper, is to provide conditions under which a
contract choice problem has a non-empty set of "stable" outcomes. There are two
types of stability concepts we study in this paper: cooperative stability and non-
cooperative stability. The cooperative stability concept that we invoke here is the
core. An outcome is said to belong to the core of a contract choice problem, if
there is no subset of agents who could select a feasible pay-off and be better off.
Roth and Postelwaite (1977) used Gale’s Top Trading Cycle Algorithm to show
that if preferences are strict, then there exists a unique competitive equilibrium
allocation, which is also the unique core allocation, for a Shapley-Scarf housing
market. However, we are able to show with the help of a three agent example, that
there exists a generalized contract choice problem, which does not admit any
stable outcome.
We show here, that an adaptation of the weak top coalition property due to
Banerjee, Konishi and Sonmez (2001), guarantees the non-emptiness of the core.
The original version of the property due to Banerjee, Konishi and Sonmez (2001)
that we adapt here, were postulated for coalition formation games, and as such do
not apply to our context of a contract choice problem.
A salient feature of many markets is to match one agent with another. This is
particularly true, in the case of assigning tasks to individuals where each task is
under the supervision of an individual, and where the set of supervisors and the
set of workers are disjoint. Such markets are usually studied with the help of
“two sided matching models” introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962) called the
marriage problem. The solution concept proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962),
called a stable matching, requires that there should not exist two agents, who
prefer each other, to the individual they have been paired with. It was shown in
Gale and Shapley (1962), in a framework where every agent has preference
defined by a linear order over the entire set of agents, that a marriage problem
always admits a stable matching. An overview of the considerable literature on
marriage problems that has evolved out of the work of Gale and Shapley (1962),
is available in Roth and Sotomayor (1990). Lahiri (2002) contains alternative
simpler proofs of some existing results and some new conclusions for two-sided
matching problems. 
In Lahiri (2003 b), we propose a generalization of a model due to Eriksson and
Karlander (1998). We allow each pair of agents a non-empty finite set of real
valued divisions of a good to choose from. Each agent is assumed to prefer more
of the good to less of it. Further, the set of agents are divided into two disjoint
sets, with one set being the set of men and the other the set of women, with no
pair of the same sex being able to obtain an allocation which is at least as good as
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with a member of the opposite sex. If each pair of agents is provided singletons to
choose from, then we have the marriage problem of Gale and Shapley (1962). In
Lahiri (2003 c) we show that the generalization proposed in Lahiri (2003 b) is
simply a particular type of contract choice problem, which invariably admits a
non-empty core. We show, that a simple generalization of the Deferred
Acceptance Procedure with men proposing due to Gale and Shapley (1962),
yields outcomes for the generalized marriage problem, which necessarily belong
the core. We also show, that any outcome of this procedure is Weakly Pareto
Optimal for Men, i.e. there is no other outcome which all men prefer to an
outcome of this procedure. This result is an extension to our framework, of a
similar result due to Roth and Sotomayor (1990). 
The non-cooperative stability concept that we study here is individual stability,
which has been proposed by Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002) for hedonic
coalition formation games, "where no allocation of goods need to be kept track
of". Our individual stability concept is a modification of the one due to
Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2001), defined so that it is consistent with the
framework of our analysis. Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2001), motivate the
applicability of their individual stability concept by providing the examples of
"professors changing universities, soccer players considering changing teams,…,
individuals changing clubs". However, there may be professors who select
universities, on the basis of the net remuneration package that each university has
to offer them, rather than on the identity of the individuals they would be
associated with were they to be employed by a particular university. Similarly, a
soccer player may choose a club, only if that club provides him at least the same
remuneration that he was receiving in his present assignment. In such situations
the value to an individual of belonging to a coalition is determined by what the
coalition assigns to the individual and not merely by the identity of other
members of the coalition. 
We say that a feasible outcome is individually stable, if there is no agent who can
unilaterally deviate by joining a coalition of agents who were earlier part of a
group, and thereby improve the condition of every member of the coalition he
joins (including himself!). Clearly an outcome in the core is individually stable,
although the converse need not be true. We show that a property, referred to here
as weak top cycle property, suffices to guarantee the existence of an individually
stable allocation. The weak top cycle property says that given any non-empty
subset of agents V, there exists a non-empty subset S of V containing s distinct
agents, an outcome and a one to one function ψ from S to the set {1,…,s} such
that: (a) members of S form a coalition at the outcome and receive a pay-off
vector at the outcome that is feasible for S; (b) each agent in S, prefers the stated
outcome to any that he would be getting by forming a coalition with one or more
agents in V who do not belong to S; (c) given any two agents a and b in S, if ψ(a)
< ψ(b), and for some coalition contained in S there is a pay-off vector, which 'a'
prefers to the given outcome, then some other member of the coalition prefers the
outcome to the pay-off vector. It is worth emphasizing that the weak top cycle
property, has some resemblance to the concepts of consecutive NTU games due to
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Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002).
Zhou (1994) introduced a concept of the bargaining set, which is a slight variation
of the original one due to Aumann and Maschler (1964). Yet another notion of a
bargaining set is due to Mas-Colell (1989). The Zhou(1994) bargaining set of a
marriage problem always contains its non-empty core. Klijn and Masso( undated)
introduced the concept of the weakly stable set for a marriage problem and
showed that it coincided with its bargaining set as defined by Zhou (1994). 
In a final section of this paper we introduce the concepts of the weak bargaining
set for contract choice problems. Our concepts resemble a possible extension of
similar concepts for marriage problems, due Klijn and Masso (undated). The basic
idea behind the weak bargaining set is a set of feasible allocations which do not
admit a credible objection (i.e. every strong objection has a strong counter-
objection). Our definition of a credible objection is somewhat different from that
of Zhou (1994) or Mas-Colell (1989), in that we require a strong counter-
objection to make none of its proponents worse off than what they were at the
time when the objection was raised. We further require that no sub-coalition of an
objecting coalition can block the objecting pay-off. We show by a three agent
example, that a natural analog of the bargaining set due to Mas-Colell (1989) may
well be empty for room-mates problems. The final result of this paper states that
every contract choice problem has a non-empty weak bargaining set.
A related paper [Lahiri (2003 a)] studies conditions which guarantee the existence
of 'stable' allocations in a generalized matching model, where each of a finite
number of agents owns a single indivisible objects, which can be re-allocated
among them, so long as the resulting allocation is not a priori infeasible. Each
agent has a strict ranking over the set of indivisible objects. In that paper
generalized matching problems are referred to as a housing market, and sufficient
conditions for the existence of non-empty cores and individually stable sets
provided, which bear some resemblance to ones provided here. The marriage and
room-mates problems of Gale and Shapley (1962) are special cases of this model. 
2.   Contract Choice Problems: Let X be a non-empty finite subset of ℵ(: the set
of natural numbers), denoting the set of participating agents. We assume that each
agent prefers more money to less.
Given S∈[X], let C(S) = {µ/ µ is a bijection on X with µ(S) = S} and C0(S) =
{µ∈C(S)/ T is a non-empty proper subset of S implies µ(T) ≠T}.
Thus, if #S ≥ 2, then the function µ: S→ S, such that µ(a) = a for all a∈S,
belongs to C(S)\ C0(S).
Let ℜ denote the set of all real numbers and ℜ+ the set of non-negative real
numbers. Let [X] denote the set of all non-empty subsets of X. Members of [X]
are called coalitions.
Given S∈[X], let C(S) = {µ/ µ is a bijection on X with µ(S) = S} and C0(S) =
{µ∈C(S)/ T is a non-empty proper subset of S implies µ(T) ≠T}.
A Contract Choice Problem (CCP) G is an ordered pair  < X, (F(S))S∈[X] > such
that for all S∈[X]: (i) F(S) is a non-empty finite subset of ℜS; (ii) F({a}) = {0}.
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money for agents in S. 
A CCP G = < X, (F(S))S∈[X] > is said to be super-additive if for all S,T∈[X], with
S∩T = φ: [x∈F(S), y∈F(T)] implies [z∈F(S∪T), where z(a) = x(a) for all a∈S
and z(a) = y(a) for all a∈T].
A CCP G = < X, (F(S))S∈[X] > is said to be a generalized matching problem if for
all a∈X there exists a function ua : X→ ℜ satisfying the following property: for
all S∈[X], F(S) ⊂ {x∈ℜS/ for some µ∈C0(S), x(a) = ua(µ(a)) for all a∈S}∪{-eS}.
The requirement that a generalized matching problem G = < X, (F(S))S∈[X] > is a
CCP, implies that F({a}) = {0} for all a∈S. Thus, F({a}) = {ua(a)} implies, ua(a)
= 0 for all a∈S. 
A CCP G = < X, (F(S))S∈[X] > is said to be a Shapley-Scarf housing market if for
all a∈X there exists a function ua : X→ ℜ satisfying the following property: for
all S∈[X], F(S) = {x∈ℜS/ for some µ∈C0(S), x(a) = ua(µ(a)) for all a∈S}.
Clearly a Shapley-Scarf housing market is a generalized matching problem.
Given a CCP G = < X, (F(S))S∈[X]>, a coalition structure for G is a partition of X.
A pay-off function is a function v : X → ℜ+. If v is a pay-off function and S∈[X],
then v|S denotes the restriction of v to the set S. 
An outcome for a CCP G = < X, (F(S)S∈[X] > is a pair (f, v), where f is a coalition
structure for G and v is a pay-off function such that (i) for all a∈X: v(a) ≥ 0; (ii)
for all S∈f: v|S∈ F(S).
The pair (f, v), where f = {{a}/ a∈X} and v(a) = 0 for all a∈X, is an outcome for
every CCP. Hence the set of outcomes is always non-empty.
Given S∈[X], let eS denote the vector in ZS such that eS(i) = 1 for all i∈S and let
#S denote the number of elements of S. 
A special case of a CCP is the room-mates problem of Gale and Shapley (1962),
where F(S) = {-e S }, whenever #S > 2. The marriage problem of Gale and
Shapley (1962) is in turn a special case of their room-mates problem. If F(S) = 
{-eS }, whenever #S > 3, then we have a possible generalization of the man,
woman and child problem of Alkan (1988).
3. The non-emptiness of the core: 
         
Given an outcome (f, v) for a CCP G = < X, (F(S))S∈[X]>, a coalition S∈[X] is
said to block (f, v) if there exists x ∈F(S): x(a) > v(a) for all a∈S. 
An outcome (f, v) for a CCP G = < X, (F(S))S∈[X] > is said to belong to the core of
G, if it does not admit any blocking coalition. Let Core(G) denote the set of
outcomes in the core of G.
An outcome (f, v) for a CCP G = < X, (F(S))S∈[X]> is said to be Weakly Pareto
Optimal if it does not admit X as a blocking coalition.
Given a CCP G = < X, (F(S))S∈[X] >, an outcome (f, v) is said to be weakly
blocked by a coalition T ⊂ X, if there exists x∈F(T): x(a) ≥ v(a) for all a∈T, with
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coalition T ⊂ X, via x∈F(T), then a∈T is said to be an active member of the
weakly blocking coalition T, if x(a) > v(a).
An outcome (f,v) is said to belong to the strict core of a CCP, if it is not weakly
blocked by any coalition. Let SCore(G) denote the set of all outcomes in the strict
core of the CCP G. Clearly, Score(G) ⊂ Core (G).
An outcome (f,v) is said to be Pareto Optimal if it does not admit X as a weakly
blocking coalition.
The following result due to Roth and Postelwaite [1977] is well known:
If G is a Shapley-Scarf housing market, then there exists at least one outcome
belonging to the core of G.
The following example due to Gale and Shapley (1962) shows that the core of a
room-mate problem may be empty.
Example 1 (Gale Shapley (1962)) : Let X = {1,2,3,4}. For a∈X, let ua: X→ℜ be
defined as follows:
u1: u1(2) = 3, u1(3) = 2, u1(4) = 1, u1(1) = 0;
u2: u2(3) = 3, u2(1) = 2, u2(4) = 1, u2(2) = 0;
u3: u3(1) = 3, u3(2) = 2, u3(4) = 1, u3(3) = 0;
u4: u4(1) = 3, u4(2) = 2, u4(3) = 1, u4(4) = 0.
Let, G = < X, (F(S))S∈[X] > be the generalized matching problem such that for all
S∈[X]: (i)F(S) = {x∈ℜS/ for some µ∈C0(S), x(a) = ua(µ(a)) for all a∈S}, if #S
∈{1,2}; (ii) F(S) ={-eS}, otherwise.
Suppose (f,v) is an outcome such that v(4) ≠ 0. If v(4) = 1, then {3,4}∈f  and v(3)
= 1. Thus,{2,3} blocks (f,v), since 2 can get 3 units and 3 can get 2 units in
F({2,3}); if v(4) = 2, then {2,4}∈f and v(2) = 1. Thus, {1,2} blocks (f,v) since 1
can get 3 units and 2 can get 2 units in F({1,2}); if v(4) = 3, then {1,4}∈f and v(1)
= 1. Thus, {1,3} blocks (f,v) since 3 can get 3 units and 1 can get 2 units in
F({1,3}). Thus, v(4) ≠ 0 implies (f,v) does not belong to Core(G). Hence suppose
v(4) = 0. If v(3) = 0, then both {2,3} and {3,4} block (f,v); if v(2) = 0, then both
{1,2}and {2,4} block (f,v); if v(1) = 0, then both {1,3} and {1,4} block (f,v).
Since v(4) = 0 requires v(a) = a for at least one a∈{1,2,3}, Core(G) = φ. 
It is worth observing that G is a super-additive CCP. 
A sufficient condition for the existence of a non-empty core of a CCP G can be
easily obtained, along the lines suggested by Banerjee, Konishi and Sonmez
(2001).
Given a CCP G, and a non-empty subset V of X, an outcome (f,v) is said to have
the weak top- coalition property for V if there exists a non-empty subset S of V
which has a finite partition {S1,…,Sg}satisfying the following properties:
a. S∈f;
b. For all a∈S1: v(a) ≥ x(a) for all x∈F(T∪{a}), T ⊂ V\{a};
7c. For all t∈{2,…,g}, a∈St , x∈F(T∪{a}), T ⊂ V\{a} and x(a) > v(a)
implies T∩Sk ≠ φ for some k < t.
Note: If (f,v) has the weak top coalition property for V with S as defined above,
and (f',v') is an outcome, such that S∈f' and v'(a) = v(a) for all a ∈S, then (f',v')
also has the weak top coalition property for V.
A CCP G = < X, (F(S)S∈[X] > is said to satisfy the weak top coalition property if
for any non-empty subset V of X, there exists an outcome (f,v), satisfying the
weak top coalition property for V.
Given a CCP G = < X, (F(S))S∈[X] >, say that an outcome (f,v) is the union under
substitutions of the outcomes (f1,v1),…,(fg,vg), if: (i) f ={S1,…,Sg}; (ii) St∈ft, for
t=1,…,g; (iii) v|St = vt|St  for t = 1,…,g.
If the outcome (f,v) is the union under disjoint substitutions of the outcomes
(f1,v1),…,(fg,vg), then we write (f,v) = ∨{(f1,v1),…,(fg,vg)}.
Theorem 1: Let G =  < X, (F(S))S∈[X] > be a CCP. If G satisfies the weak top
coalition property, then Core(G) ≠ φ.
Proof: Let G =  < X, (F(S))S∈[X] > be a CCP satisfying the weak top coalition
property. Hence, there exists an outcome (f1,v1) satisfying the weak top coalition
property for X. Let S1 be the non-empty subset of X, having the partition
{S1(1),…, S1(g(1))} such that: 
a. S1∈f1;
 b. For all a∈S1(1): v(a) ≥ x(a) for all x∈F(T∪{a}), T ⊂ X\{a}; 
 c. For all t∈{2,…,g(1)}, a∈S1(t) , x∈F(T∪{a}), T ⊂ X\{a} and x(a) > v(a)
implies T∩S1(h) ≠ φ for some h < t.
 Hence, no member of S1 will belong to a coalition which blocks (f1, v1). 
Having defined S1,…,Sk, (f1,v1),…,(fk, vk) for k ≥ 1, such that no member of
U
k
1j
jS
=
will belong to a coalition which blocks (fk, vk), let (f,v) = (fk,vk) if U
k
1j
jS
=
= X.
If U
k
1j
jS
=
= X, then (f,v) ∈Core(G). Hence suppose, U
k
1j
jS
=
≠ X. Thus, there exists an
outcome (fk+1,vk+1) with vk+1(a) = vk(a) for all a ∈U
k
1j
jS
=
 and {S1,…,Sk} ⊂ fk+1,
satisfying the weak top coalition property for X \ U
k
1j
jS
=
. Let Sk+1 be the non-empty
subset of X \ U
k
1j
jS
=
, having the partition {Sk+1(1),…, Sk+1(g(k+1))} such that: 
a. Sk+1∈fk+1;
 b. For all a∈Sk+1(1): v(a) ≥ x(a) for all x∈F(T∪{a}), T ⊂ X\{a}; 
 c. For all t∈{2,…,g(k+1)}, a∈Sk+1(t) , x∈F(T∪{a}), T ⊂ X\{a} and x(a) > v(a)
implies T∩Sk+1(h) ≠ φ for some h < t.
8 Clearly, no member of U
1k
1j
jS
+
=
will belong to a coalition which blocks (fk+1, vk+1).
 Since X is finite, there exists a positive integer K, such that U
K
1j
jS
=
= X. Let (f,v) =
(fK,vK). Thus, (f,v) ∈Core(G). Thus, Core (G) is non-empty. Q.E.D.
 
In fact the following adaptation of yet another property in Banerjee, Konoshi and
Sonmez (2001) guarantees that the strict core is a singleton.  
Given a CCP G = < X, (F(S))S∈[X] > and a non-empty subset V of X, an outcome
(f,v) is said to have the top- coalition property for V if there exists a non-empty
subset S of V satisfying the following properties:
a.    S∈f;
b.  For all a∈S, T∈V\{a} and x∈F(T∪{a}}: v(a) ≥ x(a). 
A CCP G = < X, (F(S))S∈[X] > is said to satisfy the top coalition property if for any
non-empty subset V of X, there exists an outcome (f,v) satisfying the top coalition
property for V.
Theorem 2: Let G =  < X, (F(S))S∈[X] > be a CCP. If G satisfies the top coalition
property, then [(f,v), (f',v') ∈SCore(G)] implies [v' = v].
Proof: Let G =  < X, (F(S))S∈[X] > be a CCP satisfying the top coalition property.
Hence, there exists an outcome (f1,v1) satisfying the top coalition property for X.
Let S1 be the non-empty subset of X such that: 
a. S1∈f1;
 b. For all a∈S1: v(a) ≥ x(a) for all x∈F(T∪{a}), T ⊂ X\{a}.
 Hence, no member of S1 will be an active member of a coalition which weakly
blocks (f1, v1). 
Having defined S1,…,Sk, (f1,v1),…,(fk, vk) for k ≥ 1, such that no member of
U
k
1j
jS
=
will be an active member of a coalition which weakly blocks (fk, vk), let (f,v)
= (fk,vk) if U
k
1j
jS
=
= X. If U
k
1j
jS
=
= X, then (f,v) ∈SCore(G). Hence suppose, U
k
1j
jS
=
≠
X. Thus, there exists an outcome (fk+1,vk+1) with vk+1(a) = vk(a) for all a ∈U
k
1j
jS
=
and {S1,…,Sk} ⊂ fk+1, satisfying the top coalition property for X \ U
k
1j
jS
=
. Let Sk+1
be the non-empty subset of X \ U
k
1j
jS
=
,such that: 
a. Sk+1∈fk+1;
 b. For all a∈Sk+1: v(a) ≥ x(a) for all x∈F(T∪{a}), T ⊂ X\{a}; 
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1k
1j
jS
+
=
will be an active member of a coalition which weakly
blocks (fk+1, vk+1).
Since X is finite, there exists a positive integer K, such that U
K
1j
jS
=
= X. Let (f,v) =
(fK,vK). Clearly no member of X can be an active member of a coalition which
weakly blocks (f,v). Thus, (f,v) ∈SCore(G).
Let (f'',v') ∈SCore(G). If v'(a) ≠ v(a) for some a∈S1, then S1 can weakly block
(f',v'). Thus, (f',v')∈SCore(G) implies v'(a) = v(a) for all a∈S1.
Suppose K > 1. Suppose, v'(a) = v(a) for all a∈U
k
1t
tS
=
, for some k∈{1,…,K-1}.If
v'(a) ≠ v(a) for some a∈Sk+1, then Sk+1 can weakly block (f',v'). Thus,
(f',v')∈SCore(G) implies v'(a) = v(a) for all a∈U
1k
1t
tS
+
=
. Hence, (f',v')∈SCore(G)
implies v' = v. Q.E.D. 
4.    Existence of Individually Stable Outcomes: 
Given a CCP G = < X, (F(S))S∈[X] > an outcome (f,v) is said to be unilaterally
blocked by agent a∈X, if there exists a non-empty subsets S, T of X with S\{a} ⊂
T, T∈ f  and x∈F(S) such that x(b) > v(b) for all b∈ S. 
An outcome (f,v) is said to be individually stable for G if it is not blocked by any
agent. Let IS(G) denote the set of all individually stable outcomes for G.
Given a non-empty subset V of X, an outcome (f,v) is said to have the weak top-
cycle property for V if there exists a non-empty subset S of V containing 's'
distinct elements and a one-to-one function ψ: S → {1,…,s}satisfying the
following properties:
1. S∈f;
2. For all a∈S, for all non-empty subsets T of V\ S and x∈F(T∪{a}): v(a)
≥ x(a);
3.   For all a,b∈S with ψ(a) < ψ(b), for all non-empty subsets T of V\ {a}
with b∈T and x∈F(T∪{a}): [x(a) > v(a)] implies [v(c) ≥ x(c) for some
c∈T].
A CCP G = < X, (F(S))S∈[X] > is said to satisfy the weak top cycle property if for
any non-empty subset V of X, there exists an allocation (f,v), satisfying the weak
top cycle property for V.
Theorem 3: Let G be a CCP satisfying the weak top cycle property, then IS(G)
≠φ.
Proof: Let G = < X, (F(S))S∈[X] >, (rki)i∈N> be a CCP satisfying the weak top cycle
property. Thus, there exists an outcome (f1,v1) satisfying the weak top cycle
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property for X. Let S1 be a non-empty subset of  X, containing s1 distinct agents
and a bijection ψ1: S1→ {1,…,s1} such that: (a) S1∈f; (b) For all a∈S1, for all
non-empty subsets T of X\ S1 and x∈F(T∪{a}): v(a) ≥ x(a); (c) For all a,b∈S1
with ψ1(a) < ψ1(b), for all non-empty subsets T of V\ {a} with b∈T and
x∈F(T∪{a}): [x(a) > v(a)] implies [v(c) ≥ x(c) for some c∈T].
Having obtained (ft , vt), St, ψt for τ ≥ t ≥ 1, if X \U
τ
=1t
tS ≠ φ, let (fτ+1,vτ+1) an
outcome, Sτ+1 a non-empty subset of X \U
τ
=1t
tS containing sτ+1 distinct agents and a
bijection ψτ+1 : Sτ+1→ {1,…,sτ+1} be such that: (a) Sτ+1∈fτ+1; (b) For all a∈Sτ+1,
for all non-empty subsets T of X \U
1
1t
tS
+τ
=
and x∈F(T∪{a}): v(a) ≥ x(a); (c) For all
a,b∈Sτ+1 with ψ1(a) < ψ1(b), for all non-empty subsets T of V\ {a} with b∈T and
x∈F(T∪{a}): [x(a) > v(a)] implies [v(c) ≥ x(c) for some c∈T].
Since X is a non-empty finite set, there exists a least positive integer g, such that
U
g
1t
tS
=
= X. Let (f,v) be the outcome such that f = {S1,…, Sg} and for all
k∈{1,…,g}: v(a) = vk(a), for all a∈Sk. 
Suppose there is a coalition S, such that S\{a}⊂ T for some T∈f and x ∈F(S) such
that: x(c) > v(c) for all c∈S. Suppose a∈S1. Since, a∈S1 implies v(a) ≥ x(a) if S\
{a}⊂ X\S1, it must be the case that S\ {a} ∩ S1≠ φ. If there exists b ∈ S\ {a} ∩ S1,
such that ψ1(b) > ψ1(a), then v(c) ≥ x(c) for some c∈ S\{a}. Hence suppose, ψ1(a)
> ψ1(b) for all b ∈ S\ {a} ∩ S1. Let b* be the unique element in S such that ψ1(b*)
≤ ψ1(c) for all c∈ S ∩ S1. Thus, x(b*) > v(b*), ψ1(b*) < ψ1(a), a,b∈S1, implies that
there exists c∈S\{b*} such that v(c) ≥ x(c). This contradicts x(c) > v(c) for all
c∈S.
Now suppose, a∈X \ S1 and S∩ S1≠ φ. Let b* be the unique element in S such that
ψ1(b*) ≤ ψ1(c) for all c∈ S ∩ S1. Suppose, S\{b*}∩ S1≠ φ. Let b∈ S\{b*}∩ S1.
Thus , x(b*) > v(b*), ψ1(b*) < ψ1(b), b*,b∈S1, implies that there exists c∈S\{b*}
such that v(c) ≥ x(c). This contradicts x(c) > v(c) for all c∈S. Thus, let S\{b*}∩
S1= φ. Then, v(b*) ≥ x(b*) leads to a contradiction once again.
Hence, no agent in S1 will unilaterally deviate from (f,v), and any agent who
unilaterally deviates from (f,v), must belong to X\S1 and the coalition that he
would be joining to deviate must also be a subset of X\S1. 
Proceeding as above, it is easily observed that for all k∈{1,…,g}, no a belonging
to U
k
0t
tS
=
will unilaterally deviate from (f,v). Thus, (f,v)∈IS(G). Hence, IS(G) ≠ φ.
Q.E.D.
6. Non-emptiness of the weak bargaining set:
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Given a CCP G = <X, F(S)S∈[X]> and a Pareto Optimal  outcome (f,v), the pair
((f',v'), T) where (f',v') is an outcome for G and T∈f' is said to be a strong
objection against (f,v) if v'(a) > v(a) for all a ∈T and no subset of T is a blocking
coalition for (f',v').
Given a CCP G = <X, F(S)S∈[X]>, a Pareto Optimal  outcome (f,v)∈F and a
strong objection (f',v'),T) against (f,v), an ordered pair ((f'',v''),U) where (f'',v'') is
an outcome for G and U∈ f''  is said to be a strong counter-objection against
((f',v'),T) if: (a)U\T, T\U and U∩T are all non-empty; (b)v''(a) > v'(a) for all a∈
U. 
The strong objection ((f',v'),T) against the outcome (f,v) is said to be justified, if
((f',v'),T) has no strong counter-objection.
We define the weak bargaining set of a CCP G = <X,F(S)S∈[X]>, to be the set
WB(G) = {(f,v)/ (f,v) is Pareto Optimal and such that no strong objection against
(f,v) is justified}.
Example 1 (due to Gale and Shapley (1962)) is one which has an empty core, but
a non-empty weak bargaining set. As in Example 1, let X = {1,2,3,4}. For a∈X,
let ua: X→ℜ be defined as follows:
u1: u1(2) = 3, u1(3) = 2, u1(4) = 1, u1(1) = 0;
u2: u2(3) = 3, u2(1) = 2, u2(4) = 1, u2(2) = 0;
u3: u3(1) = 3, u3(2) = 2, u3(4) = 1, u3(3) = 0;
u4: u4(1) = 3, u4(2) = 2, u4(3) = 1, u4(4) = 0.
Let, G = < X, (F(S))S∈[X] > be the generalized matching problem such that for all
S∈[X]: (i)F(S) = {x∈ℜS/ for some µ∈C0(S), x(a) = ua(µ(a)) for all a∈S}, if #S
∈{1,2}; (ii) F(S) ={-eS}, otherwise.
We saw in Example 1, that Core(G) = φ. 
However, consider v(4) = 1, v(3) = 1, v(2) = 2, v(1) = 3, f = {{1,2},{3,4}}. The
pair ((f', v'), {2,3}) is a strong objection against (f,v), where v'(2) = 3, v'(3) = 2,
v'(1) = v'(4) = 0 and f' = {{1},{4},{2,3}}. Let f'' = {{2}, {4}, {1,3}}, v''(1) = 2,
v''(3) = 3, v'' (2) = v''(4) = 0.Then the pair ((f'',v''), {1,3}) is a strong counter-
objection against ((f',v'),{2,3}). Further, (f,v) admits no blocking coalition other
than {1,3}. Since no subset of {1,3} blocks (f',v'), (f,v) belongs to WB(G).
Note that the outcome (f*,v*) such that f* = {{1,2,3},{4}} and v*(1) = v*(2) =
v*(3) = 3, v*(4) = 0, belongs to the Core(G*), where G* = < X, F(S)S∈[X]> is such
that for all S∈[X]: (i)F(S) = {x∈ℜS/ for some µ∈C0(S), x(a) = ua(µ(a)) for all
a∈S}, if #S ∈{1,2,3}; (ii) F(S) ={-eS}, otherwise.
Note that it is possible to provide a definition of the weak bargaining set modified
along the lines suggested in Mas-Colell (1989). 
Given a CCP G = <X, F(S)S∈[X]> an outcome (f,v) and a strong objection
((f',v'),T) against (f,v), an ordered pair ((f'',v''),U) is said to be a classical strong
counter-objection against ((f',v'),T) if: (a) U∈f''; (b) U\T, U\S and U∩T are all
non-empty; (c) v''(a) ≥  v(a) for all a∈U|T; (d) v''(a) > v'(a) for all a∈U. 
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The strong objection ((f',v'),T) against the outcome (f,v) is said to be classically
justified, if ((f',v'),T) has no classical strong counter-objection.
We define the classical weak bargaining set of a CCP G = <X,F(S)S∈[X]>, to be
the set WB*(G) = {(f,v)/ (f,v) is Pareto Optimal, and such that no strong objection
against (f,v) is classically justified}. 
However, the following example reveals that even for room-mates problems,
WB*(G) may be empty.
Example 2: Let X = {1,2,3}. For a∈X, let ua: X→ℜ be defined as follows:
u1: u1(2) = 2, u1(3) = 1, u1(1) = 0;
u2: u2(3) = 2, u2(1) = 1, u2(2) = 0;
u3: u3(1) = 3, u3(2) = 2, u3(3) = 0.
Let, G = < X, (F(S))S∈[X] > be the generalized matching problem such that for all
S∈[X]: (i)F(S) = {x∈ℜS/ for some µ∈C0(S), x(a) = ua(µ(a)) for all a∈S}, if #S
∈{1,2}; (ii) F(S) ={-eS}, otherwise.
Since (f,v) such that v(a) = 0 for all a∈X is not Pareto Optimal, it cannot belong
to WB*(G).
Let (f,v) be the outcome such that f = {{1,3},{2}}, v(1) = 1, v(2) = 0, v(3) = 2 and
(f',v') be the outcome such that f' = {{1,2},{3}}, v'(1) = 2, v'(2) = 1, v'(3) = 0.
Thus, ((f',v'), {1,2}) is a strong objection against (f,v). Any strong counter-
objection or classical strong counter-objection cannot contain agent 1, since agent
1 gets 2 units of money at (f',v'). The only possibility is (({{2,3}, {1}}, v''), {2,3})
where v''(1) = 0, v''(3) = 1, v''(2) = 2,which is a strong counter-objection though
not a classical strong counter-objection, since agent 3 is worse off at (f'',v'') than at
(f,v). Thus, (f,v) ∉WB*(G).   
Let (f,v) be the outcome such that f = {{1},{2,3}}, v(1) = 0, v(2) = 2, v(3) = 1 and
(f',v') be the outcome such that f' = {{1,3},{2}}, v'(1) = 1, v'(2) = 0, v'(3) = 2.
Thus, ((f',v'), {1,3}) is a strong objection against (f,v). Any strong counter-
objection or classical strong counter-objection cannot contain agent 3, since agent
3 gets 2 units of money at (f',v'). The only possibility is (({{1,2}, {3}}, v''), {1,3})
where v''(1) = 2, v''(3) = 0, v''(2) = 1,which is a strong counter-objection though
not a classical strong counter-objection, since agent 2 is worse off at (f'',v'') than at
(f,v). Thus, (f,v) ∉WB*(G).   
Hence Bar*(G) = φ.
Theorem 4: Let G be a CCP. Then, WB(G) ≠ φ.
Proof: Let G = < X, F(S)S∈[X]> be a CCP and let (f,v) be a Pareto Optimal
outcome for G. If (f,v) does not admit a strong objection then clearly, (f,v)
∈WB(G). Suppose ((f1,v1), S1) is a strong objection against (f,v) which further
does not admit a strong counter-objection. Then, no member of S1 is part of a
strong objection against (f1,v1). Clearly, there can be no strong objection ((f2,v2),
S2) against (f1,v1) such that S2∩S1≠φ. If (f1,v1) does not admit any strong
objection, then (f1,v1)∈WB(G). Suppose ((f2,v2), S2) is a strong objection against
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(f1,v1) which further does not admit a strong counter-objection. Clearly, S2∩S1=
φ. Without loss of generality suppose S1∈f2 and v2(a) = v1(a) for all a∈S1. This is
possible, since S2∩S1 = φ. Then, no member of S1∪S2 is part of a strong objection
against (f2,v2). 
Having constructed a strong objections ((fp,vp), Sp) against (fp-1,vp-1) for p = 1,….,
k, where (f0,v0) = (f,v), such that no member of U
k
1p
pS
=
is part of a blocking
coalition against (fk,vk) there are two possibilities: there does exist a strong
objection against (fk,vk) in which case (fk,vk)∈WB(G); there exists a strong
objection ((fk+1, vk+1), Sk+1) against (fk,vk). If every such strong objection admits a
strong counter-objection, then (fk,vk)∈WB(G). If not then there exists a strong
objection ((fk+1,vk+1), Sk+1), which further does not admit a strong counter-
objection. Clearly, Sk+1∩(U
k
1p
pS
=
) = φ. Without loss of generality suppose, Sp∈ fk+1
for p = 1,…,k and vk+1(a) = vk(i) for all a∈U
k
1p
pS
=
. Then no member of  U
1k
1p
pS
+
=
is
part of a strong objection against (fk+1, vk+1).
Since X is a finite set, there is a smallest positive integer K, such that either every
objection ((f',v'), T) against (fK,vK) admits a strong counter-objection, or [U
K
1p
pS
=
=
X or no member of X is part of a blocking coalition against (fK,vK). In either case,
(fK,vK)∈WB(G). Q.E.D. 
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